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Enforcement and Compliance:  Critical Practices for Community Rehabilitation 
Companies and the New NPS? 
 
ntroduction 
From its inception, the probation service has been concerned with the compliance of 
probationers and has used its authority and powers to respond to non-compliance.  
However, for most of its history, enforcement, including letters and home visits after 
missed appointments, was geared towards encouraging engagement with the 
requirements of the court order (Vanstone, 2013).  More recently, enforcement of 
orders has been seen as a good in itself and an indicator of quality and efficiency in 
the probation service’s delivery of community sanctions (Loumansky et al, 2008).  
The evident limitations of this strategy – not least the inexorable rise in the prison 
population (Whitehead, 2010) - has produced ‘a new theorising of compliance that 
suggests there is much more to achieving effectiveness in community penalties than 
forced or constrained compliance with penal ‘products’ ‘ (McCulloch, 2013: 45).  This 
article explores the implications of these new understandings as the penal landscape 
is reshaped and further privatised.  In a controversial – and to key critics, an 
ideologically driven move (see for example, Collett, 2013) – the probation role is 
being split between Community Rehabilitation Companies (CRCs) and a new version 
of the National Probation Service (NPS).  Crucially, while supervision and 
intervention of lower risk offenders will transfer to the CRCs, the NPS will retain 
responsibility for enforcement (MoJ, 2013a; MoJ, 2013b).  The quality of 
communications and practices around enforcement could thus be viewed as a 
bellwether, powerfully indicating the health and legitimacy of the in-coming system.   
  
Brief thoughts on the history and development of enforcement in probation 
Reviewing the history of criminal justice policies which give enforcement actions their 
shape and tone, Gwen Robinson (2013) helpfully identifies four eras in 
developments in England and Wales: the changes wrought by Transforming 
Rehabilitation will no doubt bring us into a further new and unfamiliar phase.  
Robinson’s eras, in turn, were characterised by:  discretion lasting from 1907 to 
1989; standardisation during the 1990s, coinciding with the introduction of National 
Standards and managerial systems; enforcement from the late 1990s through to 
2004; and, finally, pragmatism from 2004 onwards.  She argues that the notion of 
compliance and what constitutes compliant behaviour has differed in each of these 
phases or eras, as reflected in its constructions in official statements and documents 
(2013)   For example, before the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) 1991, the probation 
order was an alternative to a sentence and probationers were expected to ‘be of 
good behaviour’, co-operating with the aims and the spirit of supervision as well as 
its explicit requirements.  Accordingly, in legal terms further offending was a breach 
of the contract of trust implicit in the order (Robinson, 2013).  With the advent of 
National Standards, compliance became more directly related to attendance and 
behavioural compliance than inner beliefs and pro-social attitudes (notwithstanding 
the simultaneous increase in cognitive behavioural interventions).  The expectations 
that practitioners would respond promptly and consistently to breaches was 
enhanced through successive sets of National Standards, circumscribing their 
practice and scope for discretionary decision-making (Mair and Canton, 2007). 
 
 The ‘toughest’ period of enforcement followed new versions of National Standards  in 
2000 and 2002, alongside a provision in the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 
2000 which created a legal presumption in favour of a custodial penalty as an 
outcome in breach proceedings (Robinson, A, 2011).  However, threat-based 
approaches are problematic, assuming wrongly as they do that offenders’ actions 
spring from calculation and rational decision-making (Robinson and McNeill, 2010).  
Bullish attitudes to enforcement are also self-defeating in that they tend to undermine                       
rather than reinforce, the legitimacy of court orders and of the probation service who 
administers them (Robinson and Ugwidike, 2012), bringing many more offenders 
within the ambit of formal enforcement actions and so liable to be labelled as non-
compliant, whether justified or not (Robinson, 2013).  It seems that politicians and 
policy makers had simply failed to take sufficient account of the complexity and 
ambivalence associated with compliance (Canton and Eadie, 2005: Canton, 2011).  
When this reality did begin to dawn, one key response was to impose quantitative 
targets for completion of orders and post-custody licences.  So, although the revised 
set of National Standards published in 2007 (MoJ, 2007) did allow more room for 
professional judgement, this occurred within the existing  managerialist framework , 
evaluating the legitimacy (and thus credibility) of probation on the percentage of 
orders or requirements on orders completed without breach, instead of on the basis 
of strict enforcement (Robinson 2013).  And as always, well-intentioned targets 
seemed to create perverse incentives, with managers reluctant to support decisions 
to recall or to return an offender to court, even where warranted.  Robinson’s (2013) 
small study conducted in 2008 found practitioners expressing concern about 
inconsistencies and the poor messages this might convey to offenders, and further 
reporting that their discretion was being ‘stolen’ by managers.  This resonates with 
 my own communications with learners on the probation officer training programme 
about the organisation overruling their judgement about appropriate enforcement 
actions, and particularly concerns that their efforts to model pro-social behaviours 
and set clear behavioural expectations and boundaries are being undermined. 
 
Looking at practice 
What the above suggests is that the turn to compliance in policy terms was equally 
‘myopic’ and no more informed by an understanding of the psychologies motivating 
compliance than the drive for enforcement (Robinson and McNeill, 2008).  And it 
does raise questions, as the centrally directed bureaucracy around practice has 
further relaxed under the Coalition government, about how this has affected the way 
that practitioners now define and ‘do’ compliance (Ugwidike and Raynor, 2013).  The 
subject of compliance has featured little in empirical research, and what does exist, 
points to complexity and contradiction.  Clearly this is an area begging for further 
investigation.  On the one hand, Ugwidike’s (2010) research in one probation area in 
Wales found that probation officers go a long way to try to address practical 
problems and to build relationships with offenders, resisting a deterrence-based view 
of enforcement and deviating from the perceived rigidity of the National Standards 
then in force.  Nevertheless, in that study, the officers’ concepts of compliance were 
still closely allied to attendance, and they clearly emphasised work to remove 
obstacles to compliance, social and personal (Ugwidike, 2013).  However, while 
flexibility and responsiveness are desirable (and arguably necessary), where the 
priority becomes getting an offender through to the end of the order, rather than his 
or her progress and learning whilst under supervision, efforts may be rather 
misplaced.  Of course, as Canton (2011: 123) observes, ‘[p]robation has a duty to 
 give effect to the orders of the court and can achieve none of its purposes without 
the offender’s attendance and participation’. Yet there are dangers in offering too 
much flexibility and, effectively, taking responsibility from the offender.   Phillips 
(2011) adds insightfully to Anthony Bottoms’ (2001) well known model which 
describes compliance as variously based on instrumental concerns, constraint, habit 
or routine, or the adoption of normative values and beliefs.  His research with 
offender managers suggested that their exercise of discretion often happens behind 
closed doors with little input from the offender; while this may produce short-term 
gains in terms of motivation, it may be less helpful in promoting the type of normative 
compliance that signifies desistance.  Thus, through what he calls ‘offender 
manager-constructed compliance’, there may be evidence of formal compliance with 
the requirements of probation, but not necessarily the substantive compliance which 
denotes more active engagement and co-operation from the offender (Robinson and 
McNeill, 2008).  Moreover, it may render the offender’s non-compliance 
meaningless, nullifying the underlying expression of, for example, resistance, 
indifference or incomprehension. 
 
Considering compliance 
Interestingly, and related to the above discussion, McCulloch (2012) contends that 
both the enforcement and compliance orientations seen in recent policy, have 
constructed offenders as the objects of intervention.  Drawing on Nils Christie’s 
(1977) seminal article, Conflicts as property, she argues for a reframing of the 
enforcement/compliance debate so that professionals take a step back, recognising 
that ‘the action and pursuit of compliance (and non-compliance) is owned by the 
offender/desistor actor’ (2012: 29).  This would turn practice on its head and change 
 the role of criminal justice agencies so that it is ‘much less about how to manage or 
produce compliance (though there will be a place for the former) and much more 
about how to create the environments, relationships and resources known to 
motivate and support offenders to take responsibility for, and progress their own 
compliance journeys’ (McCulloch, 2013: 59).  The similarity with discourses around 
desistance is striking and, indeed, as Canton (2011: 126) remarks,  
 The compliance that probation seeks ultimately is desistance…..probation 
 strives to bring it about that people refrain from offending because they come 
 to see it as wrong and to have no place in their self-identity. 
 
Moving towards normative compliance requires offenders to think and act differently, 
and this has moral dimensions and associated questions of legitimacy for the 
practitioners and the agencies around them (McCulloch, 2013).  The way that 
criminal justice agencies – and practitioners within them - act and interact can be 
pivotal in providing role models and demonstrating intellectual and moral virtues that 
offenders might seek to emulate.  These contrast with the much narrower 
instrumental attempts to remoralise and responsibilise offenders evident through 
much of the New Labour era.  Research (for example, McIvor’s (1992) and 
McCulloch’s (2010) studies in community service in Scotland) suggest that positive 
features of practice encourage both short and long-term compliance behaviour, such 
features including relationships with supervisors, pro-social modelling  and help with 
personal and social problems.  Other features, in contrast, impede compliance and, 
in the context of community service, these included lack of clear objectives and 
purpose, tasks that were not seen as relevant and offender conceptions of the work 
as primarily punitive (McCulloch, 2010).  These points seem to apply across the 
 range of probation supervision and activities, giving pause for thought about the 
complex and dynamic nature of compliance and engagement.  Community penalties, 
by definition, require offenders to give up their time and to participate in activities or 
work that they would not otherwise choose to do (Canton, 2011), so motivation is 
critical.  Robinson and McNeill (2008; 2010) draw upon socio-legal research on tax 
payers to outline a model of motivational postures, characterised by defiance 
(resistance, disengagement or game-playing) or deference (commitment or 
capitulation).  Typically, over time, offenders may adopt different postures, maybe 
due to factors outside of their supervision, but crucially in response to their 
experiences of probation as well.  So they may move in a positive direction, given 
encouraging environments and relationships, from simply following the rules to a 
more substantive form of compliance (and ultimately to long-term legal compliance 
or desistance).  Conversely, practices which are inconsistent or authoritarian, for 
example, may cause potentially co-operative offenders to become resistant or 
manipulative, and even to question the legitimacy of their court orders. 
 
Enforcing compliance under Transforming Rehabilitation: looking ahead 
So far, so good.  But what does all this mean in the context of Transforming 
Rehabilitation?  In terms of structural arrangements, the Target Operating Model: 
Rehabilitation Programme (MoJ, 2013b: 10) states that the new arrangements ‘will 
give CRCs the combination of ‘grip’ or control over offenders and flexibility to deliver 
appropriate rehabilitation services’  Centrally prescribed National Standards and 
contract requirements will be minimal, in the expectation that this will allow room for 
innovation, but there will be audit and quality assurance mechanisms around the 
termination of orders and licences ‘on completion or other occurrence’  (2013: 10).   
 Effectively, these will guide enforcement practices and have potential to spawn a 
range of local policies and procedures, agreed with the public sector NPS and 
representing the ‘grip’, such as it is, referred to by the MoJ.  The diversity and 
responsiveness to local need, however, may well be compromised both by the 
nature of the market model involving large nationally agreed contracts for CRCs 
(Senior, 2013), and by the  centralised structure for the NPS which may in a different 
way create challenges for the localism agenda. 
 
Transforming Rehabilitation: A strategy for Reform (MoJ, 2013a: 23) sets out the 
government’s intentions: 
The current legislative framework combines both delivery and enforcement of a 
community order or suspended sentence order in one role, the Responsible 
Officer (RO).  Under the current framework, the RO is usually a Probation 
Trust, as a provider of probation services but for certain types of order it is a 
provider of electronic monitoring or the person in charge of an attendance 
centre.  We intend to introduce technical legislative changes so that 
 Delivery of an order can be the responsibility of either the public sector 
probation service or a contracted provider, depending on who is 
responsible for managing the offender; 
 Issuing a warning can be the responsibility of either the probation 
service or contracted provider; but 
 Laying information before the court to enforce the breach (and the 
decision in these cases on whether the breach was reasonable) would 
be reserved to the public sector probation service. 
 
 This means that the process is shared, with the CRC administering initial warnings, 
alerting the NPS of a further failure to comply and supplying evidence to support 
breach proceedings.  The NPS in turn will conduct the prosecution in court and 
prepare written and oral advice to assist in the determination and disposal.  Whereas 
these respective responsibilities seem quite clear, the area in the middle – where the 
NPS reviews the case brought by the CRC and makes a judgement about whether to 
return the order to court – may be more contentious. 
 
In addition to community orders, CRCs will assume responsibility for supervision of 
post-custody licences, following risk assessment and allocation by the NPS.  This 
will include new arrangements for the supervision of prisoners released from a 
sentence of less than 12 months.  Again, the enforcement role falls to the NPS, who 
will review cases and deal with recalls or, where considered appropriate, issue 
warnings or apply for variations of licence conditions.  These are potentially 
sophisticated decisions on breach action or recall where the NPS should rightly be 
able to draw on its knowledge and expertise, but the division of roles establishes an 
inherent power differential between the two agencies which may be an enduring 
source of discomfort and irritation.   
 
Transforming Rehabilitation also stipulates that CRCs must refer cases to the NPS 
where there is an escalation of risk level such that the offender is considered at high 
risk of serious harm.  Although the NPS will have authority to identify trigger points or 
risk indicators at the point of allocation to the CRC that would require the case to be 
referred back (MoJ, 2013b), this again will be an area of judgement and therefore 
potential inter-agency conflict.  Such conflict may be heightened in the face of 
 commercial considerations for CRCs and the pressures inherent in Payment by 
Results, destabilising existing risk management processes.  As Guilfoyle (2013: 39) 
notes ‘[p]lacing so much reliance on commercial contracts seems a very high risk 
strategy when dealing with many of society’s most difficult, damaged and dangerous 
individual’s.’  In this context, there may be strong incentives for CRCs to under-report 
instances of both escalating risk and non-compliance, practices which would  surely 
pose a significant threat to the new arrangements 
 
There are concerns also from the perspective of offenders, as having two separate 
agencies dealing with their infractions could be deeply unsatisfactory or even 
downright discriminatory (although in theory each could act as a check and balance 
on the practice of the other).  If the two operate in tandem, working in ways that are 
respectful and mutually reinforcing, this should support the primary supervisory 
relationship and model the sorts of collaborative and problem-solving approaches 
conducive to desistance (see, for example, Rex, 1999 and McNeill and Weaver, 
2010).  But this is being hopeful.  In reality, it is not too difficult to envisage situations 
that allow offenders (or their defence counsel) to make mischief where they see 
evident disagreements or inconsistencies between CRCs and the NPS.  It is also 
possible that the CRCs and the NPS could find themselves cast as ‘good cop/ bad 
cop’ undermining attempts to provide a unified and coherent response to the 
offender and his or her capacity or willingness to engage.  Perceived injustices or 
inflexibility at the interface of a CRC and the NPS could amplify resistance or 
undermine the motivation of a co-operative and receptive individual.  If this were to 
extend across a significant proportion of the population under CRC supervision, it 
 could provoke a crisis of legitimacy from which it would be extremely difficult to 
recover. 
 
Smooth administrative arrangements are important in order to ensure that any 
system of enforcement operates effectively and in a just and fair manner.  Here the 
division of roles may be particularly unhelpful and may act to the detriment of 
offenders by causing delays and confusion.  Protocols and procedures will no doubt 
be introduced in order to pre-empt lengthy reviews and time taken up resolving 
disputes or different interpretations of facts or offender motivations.  And herein lies 
one of the central paradoxes inherent in Transforming Rehabilitation: structural 
changes made with the intention of reducing bureaucracy, creating innovation and 
increasing practitioner discretion may have exactly the opposite effect.  The 
difficulties in trying to explain practitioner judgement and the latitude given to an 
offender across agency boundaries, in essence, may result in CRCs resorting to a 
form of rule-based enforcement (albeit rules devised locally rather than by central 
government).   Conversely, practitioners in the NPS, who could be expected to have 
more nuanced understandings of motivations and behaviours, may nevertheless be 
wary of disagreeing with the CRCs because of the repercussions this might have for 
on-going inter-agency relationships.  It can be anticipated, therefore, that what we 
will see in practice is a construction of compliance that plays to the lowest common 
denominator, and is once again based around attendance and other indicators that 
can be quantified and evidenced.  This would be deeply regrettable in the light of the 
new insights and awareness of the psychological and social dimensions of 
compliance discussed earlier in this article. 
 
 Towards positive practices 
That is not to say that all is doom and gloom.  CRCs will deal with a large volume of 
offenders with diverse characteristics and needs, and may form a complex mosaic of 
provision.  Certainly, the MoJ aspiration is for the Voluntary, Community and Social 
enterprise sector to join with prime contractors as ‘supply chain partners’, although 
doing so may present challenges and risks for small organisations (Marples, 2013).  
Nevertheless, it may reasonably be expected that CRCs will offer specialist provision 
for women, drug using offenders and individuals experiencing mental ill-health, and 
in some areas projects or team working with specific minority ethnic groups, 
homeless offenders or young adults, for example.  Specialised teams may develop 
close relationships with the NPS in their local areas, and especially so where the 
NPS is able to dedicate individual officers to work consistently with these teams or 
projects, building joint understandings and good practices.   
 
The challenge, however, will be to develop systems and practice consistently across 
the two agencies, not just in small pockets.  With this in mind, CRCs and the NPS 
could benefit from investment in joint training events and workshops for practitioners 
and managers.  Secondments of probation officers from the NPS to work in CRCs 
may also be fruitful.  The immediate pay-offs, though, will be highly contingent on 
where secondees are placed and the authority they are able to exercise in order to 
guide and influence practice, and also on the degree of openness and receptiveness 
to their advice and interventions that they encounter.  It is not possible to anticipate 
in any great detail the atmosphere and culture of CRCs in their early lives, but there 
could well be defensiveness and resistance amongst practitioners directed there 
from the current Probation Trusts where they were previously empowered to make 
 their own judgements about enforcement actions.  Curtailing the autonomy of CRC 
practitioners is not likely to be a popular move and could easily result in a backlash 
against NPS practitioners.  First line and middle managers may also be sensitive 
about the limits on their decision-making powers, particularly in the face of 
organisational demands to produce high levels of orders and licences completed 
without breach.   
 
Considering more ambitious visions for the CRC/NPS interface, lessons might be 
learnt from the compliance panels held by the Probation and Aftercare Service in 
Jersey in the British Channel Islands.  Raynor (2013) describes the essential building 
blocks as being: guidelines allowing the reasonable use of discretion; a high level of 
agreement between practitioners and managers about the right way to treat people; 
and use of ‘compliance meetings’, typically involving the offender, practitioner and 
manager to review cases before formal breach action.  Raynor’s research suggests 
that this provides a constructive deliberative forum and allows the offender to 
participate more freely than in a formal court setting, so encouraging the co-
production (McCulloch, 2013) of future compliance.  The system is characterised by 
a high degree of endorsement from senior managers, so enforcement practice and 
discretion in decision-making are openly and transparently discussed, unlike the 
research from the mainland which suggests that, in many instances, practitioners 
have been creative and have even resorted to subverting official guidelines in the 
interests of fairness and responsivity (Ugwidike, 2010; Phillips, 2011).   
 
Following proposals in the Breaking the Cycle White Paper (MoJ, 2010), compliance 
panels have been piloted in the youth justice system (www.justice.gov.uk) which  
 may give indications of the opportunities and challenges that might be involved in 
introducing this on a much larger scale.  Of course, both the Jersey Probation and 
After Care Service and the youth justice system on the mainland are more attuned to 
social and welfare needs than the present probation service, and so culturally these 
practices are more consistent with their overall approaches.  Indeed, Youth Offender 
Panels dealing with referral orders, if they work as intended, already provide a forum 
for discussion and problem solving (Crawford and Newburn, 2003), so establishing 
this practice more widely is likely to be less of a stretch than it would be for 
probation.  Notwithstanding the additional concerns that arise  when small scale 
practices which have received heavy investment become routinised, panels in some 
shape or form that bring CRCs and NPS together with offenders,  certainly bear 
more than passing consideration.  While it is true that they could be run in a 
tokenistic way, used thoughtfully, they could provide scope for meaningful 
communication about the purposes of community sanctions and exploration of 
motivation and compliance in individual cases. 
 
Developing practices such as compliance panels or review meetings would be in the 
gift of the NPS and CRCs.  In the medium term, other parts of the criminal justice 
system may also develop practices and structures helpful to the enforcement/ 
compliance debate.  In particular, drugs courts and other problem-solving courts may 
provide arenas for discussing compliance, engagement and progress, through use of 
review mechanisms as well as breach proceedings.  Essentially, drug courts are a 
different way of delivering justice, with a closer integration of criminal justice and 
treatment goals, and attention to process rather than formal court procedures 
(McIvor, 2009).  Already well established in the US, they have been piloted in the UK 
 in the sheriff courts in Glasgow and Fife, and more recently in both Leeds and West 
London.  Within the US model, the effect is to create a stronger alliance between the 
courts and treatment providers, and to largely strip out the mediating and monitoring 
function of probation (Bean, 2008).  The UK model still retains an important role for 
probation or criminal justice social workers, yet seeks to forge a more direct link 
between the judge or sheriff and the offender and to foster a greater degree of 
informed interest.  Studies in Scotland found that participants were positive about 
their experiences and found sheriffs knowledgeable and sensitive to the issues that 
they face (McIvor, 2009).  Drugs courts are associated with reduced recidivism 
(McIvor, 2010), but their benefits are much wider than that: 
The exchanges that take place between sentencers and offenders can be a 
critical element in encouraging compliance both during an order and in the 
longer term.  Elements of procedural justice were clearly manifested in the 
Scottish drugs courts and this, according to Tyler (1990), is likely to confer 
greater legitimacy to sentencers and to increase the responsiveness of 
participants to exhortations that they should change 
         (McIvor, 2009: 47) 
This model is interesting in that it takes the central role in producing compliance – 
with both the letter and the spirit of the court order – from the probation service and 
hands it squarely back to the offender.  This suggests that probation – or in our new 
scenario, the NPS and CRCs – would still play a significant, but supporting part.  
Clearly this is helpful in terms of encouraging offenders to take ownership and 
responsibility for change (McCulloch, 2010).  ‘Therapeutic jurisprudence’ of this kind 
could also neatly sidestep tensions between the NPS and CRCs, as both would 
contribute but neither would control the process. 
  
Concluding thoughts 
This brings us nicely back to thinking about compliance in the context of justice, 
meaning wider social justice and the justice system.  If the probation service is, as 
McNeill (2011) argues, a justice agency, this creates a particular onus on all parties 
involved in Transforming Rehabilitation to ensure that justice, legitimacy and fairness 
are central concerns in the changes ahead.  Failure to do so and a return to inflexible 
enforcement practices would be deeply regrettable, acting to further marginalize and 
exclude the already marginalized and excluded.   In the best of all worlds, developing 
knowledge and understanding about compliance - whether short-term or long term, 
superficial or substantive - would inform the new arrangements and inter-agency 
relationships.  But the reality is that we live in a messy world; moreover, a world 
where justice has been increasingly treated as a commodity, not a matter of 
principle, and impacted by a series of market-based reforms (Bowen and Donaghue, 
2013)..   
 
Transforming Rehabilitation and the contracting out of services are being pushed 
through at considerable pace which does not inspire confidence in positive outcomes 
(Senior, 2013).  This article has exposed more potential problems than solutions, but 
perhaps we should not take an entirely dystopian view.  The interface between the 
NPS and CRCs may prove to be more jagged-edged than smooth, but if the will is 
there, some helpful and creative practices will emerge.  We should perhaps maintain 
some little hope that experiments and innovations do not disappear into the divide 
between the two, and that there is a critical mass of probation-minded individuals 
prepared to keep working constructively with, and for, individuals on either side.  The 
 alternative scenario is deeply disturbing and will impact severely on the viability and 
credibility of the new NPS and CRCs.  That in itself may be sufficient to motivate 
practitioners and managers to strive to make the new system ‘work’ and to mitigate 
the problems inherent in the new structures and inter-agency relationships 
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